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This study aims to discuss approaches to assessing the value of medicines. Economic evaluation 
assesses value by means of the incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER). Health is maximized 
by selecting medicines with increasing ICERs until the budget is exhausted. The budget size 
determines the value of the threshold ICER and vice versa. Alternatively, the threshold value 
can be inferred from pricing/reimbursement decisions, although such values vary between 
countries. Threshold values derived from the value-of-life literature depend on the technique 
used. The World Health Organization has proposed a threshold value tied to the national GDP . As 
decision makers may wish to consider multiple criteria, variable threshold values and weighted 
ICERs have been suggested. Other approaches (i.e., replacement approach, program budgeting 
and marginal analysis) have focused on improving resource allocation, rather than maximizing 
health subject to a budget constraint. Alternatively, the generalized optimization framework and 
multi-criteria decision analysis make it possible to consider other criteria in addition to value.
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identify papers that refer to the papers that have been selected 
in a previous wave. This process continued until no additional 
papers were included.
Papers were identified by searching PubMed, specific health eco-
nomic journals (Cost-Effectiveness and Resource Allocation, European 
Journal of Health Economics, Expert Review of Pharmacoeconomics 
and Outcomes Research, Health Economics, Health Technology 
Assessment, International Journal of Technology Assessment in Health 
Care, Journal of Health Economics, Journal of Medical Economics, 
Medical Decision Making, PharmacoEconomics, Value in Health), 
and the bibliography of included papers. The search was limited to 
English-language papers published in 2010 or earlier.
The results of the literature search are presented in Figure 1.
Methodological basis of the iceR
This section outlines the basic principles underlying the threshold 
ICER approach and its variant, the net health benefit approach.
the thReshold iceR appRoach
The use of the ICER in informing decisions to maximize health 
subject to a budget constraint was originally proposed by Weinstein 
and Zeckhauser (1973). These authors considered the case of a 
health care payer who could fund some, but not all medicines due 
to a budget constraint. It can be shown that, if medicines are ranked 
from the lowest to the highest ICER (a so-called league table), health 
can be maximized by selecting medicines with increasing ICERs 
until the budget is exhausted. The ICER of the last medicine (i.e., 
the medicine with the highest cost per unit of outcome ratio) to 
be selected is called the threshold ICER or lambda (λ).
The threshold ICER, λ, represents the opportunity cost of 
resources at the margin. If a decision maker considers reimburs-
ing a new medicine from the same budget, the ICER of the new 
intRoduction
Economic evaluation serves as a tool to assess the value of a medi-
cine by comparing the costs and outcomes of a medicine with those 
of a relevant comparator (Drummond et al., 2005). The results 
of an economic evaluation can be expressed in the form of an 
incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER). This ratio relates the 
difference in costs between a medicine and the comparator to the 
difference in outcomes. Evidence derived from economic evalu-
ations is used to inform pharmaceutical pricing/reimbursement 
decisions in many countries.
The aim of this study is to discuss current advances and future 
directions for assessing the value of medicines. Firstly, this study 
outlines the methodological basis for assessing the value of medi-
cines in comparison with a threshold ICER, reviews the strengths 
and weaknesses of the threshold ICER approach, and discusses 
various approaches to determine the threshold ICER. Secondly, a 
number of alternative approaches to assessing the value of medi-
cines are presented. This information will aid health care decision 
makers and researchers to interpret economic evaluations and their 
results for the purpose of decision making.
MateRials and Methods
It was not appropriate to conduct a systematic literature review 
of how an economic evaluation assesses the value of medi-
cines. This is because a conventional search strategy using terms 
such as “economic evaluation,” “value,” “efficiency” and “cost-
  effectiveness” is likely to result in a very large number of irrel-
evant references. Instead, the so-called “citation pearl growing” 
method was adopted. This method identified an initial set of core 
references on economic evaluation and assessment of the value 
of medicines. A first search wave then looked for papers that cite 
the set of core references. Successive waves were carried out to Frontiers in Pharmacology | Pharmaceutical Medicine and Outcomes Research  September 2010  | Volume 1  |  Article 115  |  2
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new medicines constantly enter the market and old medicines are 
withdrawn from the market by pharmaceutical companies or are 
delisted (e.g., in France). This implies that the medicines listed in a 
league table change over time, thus resulting in a new value for λ.
The threshold ICER depends on health care productivity. If the 
productivity in the health care sector increases through, for exam-
ple, substitution of generic medicines for originator medicines, a 
greater health improvement can be gained from the same budget. 
This implies that, if the size of the budget remains constant, then 
the threshold ICER will decrease.
net health benefit
The net health benefit approach uses a threshold ICER to generate 
a net health benefit measure expressed in monetary terms (Stinnett 
and Mullahy, 1998). In essence, the additional costs of a medicine 
vis-à-vis the comparator are divided by the threshold ICER to gen-
erate the following term:
(C1 − C0)/λ
where C1 is the cost of a medicine; C0 is the cost of the comparator; 
λ is the threshold ICER.
This term represents the additional outcomes that the medi-
cine would be expected to generate if it had an ICER equal to the 
threshold ICER.
The net health benefit is defined as:
NHB = (E1 − E0) − (C1 − C0)/λ
where C1 is the cost of a medicine; C0 is the cost of the comparator; E1 
and E0 are the outcomes of a medicine and the comparator, respec-
tively; NHB is the net health benefit; λ is the threshold ICER.
A medicine provides value if the actual additional outcomes 
produced by the medicine exceed the additional outcomes that the 
medicine would be expected to generate if it had an ICER equal to 
the threshold ICER. In other words, a medicine provides value if 
the net health benefit is positive.
Given that the net health benefit approach reformulates the 
ICER into a net health benefit measure, the strengths and weak-
nesses of assessing the value of medicines by means of the ICER 
also apply to the net health benefit approach (cfr. infra).
medicine needs to be compared with the threshold ICER of the 
last medicine that is currently reimbursed. If the ICER of the new 
medicine is lower than λ, the replacement of the last medicine that 
is currently reimbursed by the new medicine would increase total 
health subject to the budget constraint. If the ICER of the new 
medicine exceeds λ, reimbursement of the new medicine would 
reduce total health.
For decision-making purposes, the threshold ICER represents 
the maximum cost per unit of outcome that a health care payer 
is willing to pay for a medicine. This means that a medicine with 
an ICER below the threshold value λ is likely to be accepted for 
reimbursement by a health care payer and a medicine with a ratio 
exceeding the threshold is likely to be refused.
This methodology draws on several assumptions, including 
the existence of a fixed budget, the use of health maximization 
as the only criterion informing resource allocation decisions, the 
availability of complete information on costs and outcomes of all 
medicines and comparators in the league table, perfect divisibility 
and constant returns to scale of medicines. A fixed budget means 
that the size of the budget does not change within a specific time 
period. Perfect divisibility means that a health care payer can fund 
medicines in infinitely small units (thus avoiding the problem of 
indivisibilities). Constant returns to scale apply if the ICER does 
not depend on the volume of medicines.
Under this model, the size of the budget determines the value of 
the threshold ICER. If the budget increases, medicines with higher 
ICERs can be selected. If the budget decreases, only the medicines 
with the highest value (i.e., the lowest ICERs) can be selected. 
Alternatively, the specification of a value for λ determines the size 
of the budget to be spent on medicines. If a health care payer sets a 
threshold value for λ, this implies that the payer is willing to select 
all medicines with an ICER below λ (because they are deemed to 
provide value), thereby setting the size of the budget.
It should be noted that the threshold ICER is subject to uncer-
tainty. As there is uncertainty in economic evaluation related to, 
for instance, methodological disagreements, researchers’ assump-
tions, imprecise data, need to extrapolate results over time, need to 
generalize results to other settings or other countries, the ICER of a 
medicine is not set, but stochastic (Sendi et al., 2002). Furthermore, 
Figure 1 | Flow chart of literature search.www.frontiersin.org  September 2010  | Volume 1  |  Article 115  |  3
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et al., 2006). This funding issue may cause problems for regional 
health care payers with budget responsibility, leading to limited 
use of health economic data in practice by such payers (Godman 
et al., 2009).
Finally, it should be noted that in practice a limited number of 
new medicines have added health benefit, whereas the majority 
of medicines have a similar effectiveness to current alternatives. 
It is estimated that among those medicines with a health benefit, 
most new medicines have a health benefit only and approximately 
10% of new medicines are truly innovative or have a significant 
added health benefit (Sermet et al., 2010). Consequently, calcu-
lating ICERs could only be relevant in reality for a minority of 
new medicines, with payers increasingly expecting similar or lower 
prices to current alternatives when new medicines are similar and 
expecting marginally increased prices when new medicines have 
an added benefit but are not innovative.
stRengths and weaknesses of the thReshold iceR 
appRoach
The literature has identified a number of strengths and weaknesses 
of the threshold ICER approach that relates to its methodology 
or its use in decision making (see Table 1) (Eichler et al., 2004; 
Dolan et al., 2005; Donaldson and Gerard, 2005; Bell et al., 2006; 
Birch and Gafni, 2006b; Gafni and Birch, 2006; Cohen et al., 2007; 
Wettermark et al., 2008; Tilson and Barry, 2010).
The threshold ICER approach does not consider the budget 
impact of adopting a new medicine. This can be illustrated with 
the example of trastuzumab for early-stage breast cancer. Although 
trastuzumab is seen as beneficial in terms of the cost per QALY in 
many countries, it is associated with an appreciable increase in costs 
versus the product(s) it replaces. As a result, some patients may be 
denied treatment if a program involving trastuzumab is nation-
ally adopted without any changes in budget allocation (Barrett 
Table 1 | Strengths and weaknesses of the threshold iCer approach.
(A) Strengths
MeThodology
+ Explicit methodology for informing resource allocation decisions.
deCiSion MAKing
+ Increased consistency and transparency of decision-making process.
+ Enhanced public trust in resource allocation decisions.
+ Absence of a threshold ICER approach generates room for arbitrariness and ad hoc resource allocation decisions.
(B) Weaknesses
MeThodology
−   Setting a threshold value for λ (implying that the payer funds all medicines with an ICER below λ) may lead to uncontrolled growth in pharmaceutical 
expenditure. Also, as the budget needed to fund additional medicines that satisfy the threshold ICER may originate from disinvestment of existing 
medicines (and their associated health outcomes), the net impact may be a reduction in total health.
− Decision makers focus on specific budget and do not consider costs outside the budget (so-called budget silo mentality).
− Complete information on costs and outcomes of all medicines and comparators in the league table is not available.
−   Relevant information is not available (e.g., evidence on absolute rather than relative effectiveness, use of surrogate rather than final effectiveness 
measures).
− Perfect divisibility does not apply if decision makers wish to provide a medicine to all patients even if the ICER differs among various patient subgroups.
−   Constant returns to scale do not apply because although the medicine volume is unlikely to affect effectiveness, it is likely to impact costs and, thus, the 
ICER.
− Problems associated with league tables include internal consistency of reported ICERs and transferability of ICERs between decision-making contexts.
deCiSion MAKing
− Determination of explicit threshold ICERs is a politically sensitive issue.
− Companies may “play the system” by setting prices just under the threshold ICER value, which may mean higher prices in reality.
− The threshold value needs to rise with inflation, requiring constant adjustment.
−   Decision makers consider other criteria in addition to value (e.g., equity, affordability, innovative nature of medicine, availability of alternative treatment 
options).
− Different threshold ICER values between countries leads to inequality between individuals depending on country of residence.
− Decision makers may not apply a single threshold ICER to different types of medicines and decision contexts.
− Difficulties involved in taking a decision taking into account uncertainty associated with cost-effectiveness results.
− Individuals may have a different threshold ICER depending on, for example, the amount, duration and type of outcome.
−   Decision makers may find it difficult to discontinue paying for the last medicine that is currently reimbursed by the budget in the advent of a new medicine 
that provides better value.
− Factors such as whether decisions are legally binding or not influence medicine acceptance/rejection rates.
− Commercially-funded economic evaluations may be more likely to meet threshold ICER values, thus pointing to possible biases in study conduct.Frontiers in Pharmacology | Pharmaceutical Medicine and Outcomes Research  September 2010  | Volume 1  |  Article 115  |  4
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The Belgian Medicine Reimbursement Committee does not use 
a threshold ICER when assessing the value of medicines (Cleemput 
and Van, 2009). A retrospective analysis reviewed 824 pharmaceuti-
cal reimbursement dossiers submitted between 2002 and 2004. Of 
those dossiers, 81% gained reimbursement, whereas 19% did not. 
If the applicant proved added therapeutic value versus available 
alternatives, the probability of reimbursement increased to 91% 
(Van Wilder and Dupont, 2008).
In Canada, guidelines have been proposed about how valuable a 
new medicine has to be to warrant utilization (Laupacis et al., 1992). 
Three grades of recommendation were suggested: the evidence for 
adoption is strong if a medicine costs less than CAN$20,000 per 
QALY; moderate if a medicine costs between CAN$20,000 per 
QALY and CAN$100,000 per QALY; and weak if a medicine costs 
more than CAN$100,000 per QALY. The authors acknowledged 
that these threshold values were arbitrary, but they were chosen 
following a review of economic evaluations and previously sug-
gested guidelines. It was argued that medicines with an ICER below 
CAN$20,000 per QALY are almost universally accepted and are 
considered to represent an appropriate use of scarce resources. Also, 
many medicines with an ICER between CAN$20,000 per QALY 
and CAN$100,000 per QALY are provided routinely, although the 
availability of some medicines is limited and the appropriateness 
of others for specific patient groups is questioned.
The National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) 
in England and Wales uses a threshold ICER of £20,000 per QALY, 
although health technologies with an ICER above this threshold 
can be recommended for use in the National Health Service (NHS) 
if there is a strong case to do so. A review of NICE guidance issued 
between 1999 and 2005 concluded that health technologies having 
an ICER exceeding £30,000 per QALY were unlikely to be recom-
mended (Raftery, 2006). Judgments about what is regarded as an 
(un)acceptable ICER are made by NICE’s advisory committees, 
which consist of clinicians and health managers working in the 
NHS, statisticians, health economists, and patients (Rawlins and 
Culyer, 2004).
In Ireland, there is no threshold ICER value (Tilson and Barry, 
2010). In the past, new medicines with an ICER below 45,000 € 
per QALY tended to be reimbursed. If a medicine has an ICER 
that is significantly higher than other technologies that have been 
funded or reimbursed, other factors need to be considered, such 
as: the level of uncertainty associated with the effectiveness and 
cost-effectiveness data, the budget impact and the opportunity 
cost of investing in the new medicine, the innovative nature of the 
medicine, and the availability of alternatives.
In the late 1990s, a threshold ICER of 20,000 € per QALY has 
been proposed by the Dutch Health Care Insurance Board (Health 
Care Insurance Board, 1999). More recently, the Health Council 
suggested a value of 80,000 € per QALY for illnesses associated 
with a considerable burden. This value reflected the application 
of the World Health Organization (WHO) threshold ICER to the 
Netherlands (cfr. infra), a comparison of threshold ICERs used in 
other countries, and the cost of 1 year of nursing care.
The Pharmaceutical Medicines Agency (PHARMAC) of New 
Zealand does not use a threshold ICER below which a medicine 
is considered to provide good value. This is because the size of 
the budget varies from year to year and because decisions take 
alteRnative appRoaches to deteRMine  
a thReshold iceR
Due to the lack of information on costs and outcomes of all med-
icines and comparators in the league table, it is in practice not 
possible to determine the value of the threshold ICER. Therefore, 
alternative approaches to determine the threshold ICER have 
been proposed.
thReshold iceRs deRived fRoM Medicine pRicing/
ReiMbuRseMent decisions
Threshold ICERs can be derived from medicine pricing/reim-
bursement decisions. These threshold ICERs have either been 
explicitly specified by the health care payer or can be implicitly 
determined from examining past medicine pricing/reimburse-
ment decisions. Table 2 provides an overview of threshold val-
ues used to inform pricing/reimbursement decisions in Australia 
(George et al., 2001), Canada (Laupacis et al., 1992), England and 
Wales (Rawlins and Culyer, 2004; Raftery, 2006), the Netherlands 
(Health Care Insurance Board, 1999), New Zealand (PHARMAC, 
2007), Scotland (Webb, 2009), and the United States (Grosse, 
2008). This Table shows that threshold values vary substantially 
between countries.
A retrospective analysis examined 355 medicines considered 
by the Australian Pharmaceutical Benefits Advisory Committee 
for reimbursement between 1991 and 1996 (George et al., 2001). 
Decisions to (not) reimburse medicines were investigated with a 
view to eliciting the threshold ICER that the committee applies 
to inform decisions. The study did not find a specific threshold 
ICER beyond which the committee is unwilling to reimburse a 
medicine. Rather, the authors observed that the committee was 
unlikely to reject a medicine for which the ICER is less than 
AUS$42,000 per life year. Also, the committee was unlikely to rec-
ommend a medicine for which the ICER surpassed AUS$76,000 
per life year.
Table 2 | Threshold iCer values in a selection of countries.
Country  Threshold value  Threshold value 
  in local currency  in euro
Australia  AUS$42,000–76,000 24,700–44,700  € 
  per life year  per life year
Canada  CAN$20,000–100,000 12,700–63,300  € 
  per QALY  per QALY
England £20,000–30,000 22,800–34,100  € 
and Wales  per QALY  per QALY
Netherlands 20,000–80,000  € 20,000–80,000  € 
  per QALY  per QALY
New Zealand  NZ3,000–15,000  1,400–7 ,200 € 
  per QALY  per QALY
Scotland £20,000–30,000  22,800–34,100  € 
  per QALY  per QALY
United States  US$50,000  34,400 € 
  per QALY  per QALY
Local threshold values were converted into Euro using market exchange rates 
on 14th September 2009.
ICER, incremental cost-effectiveness ratio; QALY, quality-adjusted life year.www.frontiersin.org  September 2010  | Volume 1  |  Article 115  |  5
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preference approach (19 studies on occupational safety and eight 
studies on non-occupational safety), and the willingness-to-pay 
approach (eight studies). The median value of a QALY (or the 
threshold ICER) amounted to US$24,777 based on the human 
capital approach; US$93,402 based on the approach to reveal 
preferences about non-occupational safety; US$428,286 based on 
the approach to reveal preferences about occupational safety; and 
US$161,305 based on the willingness-to-pay approach.
Threshold ICERs based on the value of a life suffer from a number 
of limitations. Typically, the human capital and willingness-to-pay 
approaches assign a higher weight to the lives of wealthy individuals. 
Also, it is not always clear whether individuals take into account the 
impact of a health state on productivity, taxes and income when 
assessing the value of a QALY. Furthermore, it seems appropriate to 
found medicine pricing/reimbursement decisions on the notion of 
societal value. However, the value-of-life literature elicits individual 
value rather than societal value. A more detailed discussion of the 
strengths and limitations of the human capital, revealed prefer-
ence and willingness-to-pay approaches is beyond the scope of this 
article, but can be found in the specialized literature (Johannesson 
and Jonsson, 1991; Bayoumi, 2004; Mason et al., 2008).
thReshold iceRs linked to gdp
The WHO has attempted to provide a more objective national 
threshold ICER that reflects affordability by tying it to the GDP of 
a country (WHO Commission on Macroeconomics and Health, 
2001). The threshold ICER is expressed in terms of the outcome 
measure of disability-adjusted life years (DALYs). The DALY gauges 
disease burden by quantifying the impact of premature death 
and disability on a population in a single measure. The WHO 
Commission on Macroeconomics and Health suggested that health 
technologies costing less than three times GDP per capita for each 
DALY averted represent good value. The commission justified this 
threshold ICER on the basis of expected direct and indirect benefits 
to national economies. This recommendation primarily targeted 
low-income countries, but can also be applied with(out) adjust-
ment to more affluent countries.
An alternative approach is founded on the notion that each 
individual is entitled to the per capita GDP as this represents a 
fair share of a country’s wealth (Williams, 2004). An individual 
could then spend this per capita GDP on improving his/her health 
during 1 year. In other words, the per capita GDP serves as the 
threshold value for the average cost-effectiveness ratio. However, 
as this approach is founded on the average rather than the ICER, it 
cannot serve as an appropriate value for the threshold ICER. Also, 
this approach is unrealistic in assuming that a country is willing 
to allocate its whole GDP to health care. Such an approach could 
be applied to setting a threshold value for any good or service in 
the economy and, thus, cannot be used for choosing between any 
of them (McCabe et al., 2008).
vaRiable thReshold iceRs and weighted iceRs
The specification of a fixed threshold ICER does not take into 
account that decision makers may wish to account for other criteria 
in addition to value when assessing a medicine pricing/reimburse-
ment decision. Other criteria may relate to, for instance, equity 
considerations. Therefore, decision makers may not wish to apply 
into account criteria other than value. A retrospective analysis 
of PHARMAC decisions indicates that the threshold ICER was 
NZ$11,797 per QALY in 1998/1999; NZ$3,276 per QALY in 
1999/2000; NZ$13,105 per QALY in 2000/2001; NZ$2,991 per QALY 
in 2001/2002; NZ$8,135 per QALY in 2002/2003; NZ$15,768 per 
QALY in 2003/2004; and NZ$12,117 per QALY in 2004/2005. The 
cumulative volume–weighted average threshold ICER was NZ$6,865 
per QALY between 1998 and 2005 (PHARMAC, 2007).
The Scottish Medicine Consortium has assessed the value of 
around 600 medicines from 2002 to 2008 (Webb, 2009). Of these 
600 medicines, 30% were accepted for use, 33% were accepted for 
restricted use and 37% were not recommended. If the cost per 
QALY was less than or equal to £20,000 per QALY, there was a 
probability of 80% that the medicine was accepted. If the cost per 
QALY ranged from £20,000 to £30,000 per QALY, this probability 
decreased to 42%. A submission was more likely to succeed if one 
or more of the following conditions was satisfied: innovative treat-
ment, clear effect on relevant clinical outcomes, sizeable QALY 
benefit and clear cost per QALY case, direct comparison with cur-
rent practice, transparent modeling with sensitivity analysis, and 
data relevant to Scottish patients.
Since the mid-1990s, economic evaluations in the United States 
commonly apply a threshold ICER of US$50,000 per QALY (Owens, 
1998; Grosse, 2008). Historically, this threshold has been attributed 
to an economic evaluation examining the value of renal dialysis in 
end-stage renal disease in 1984. As renal dialysis is the only treat-
ment that Medicare is required to fund, it is argued that US$50,000 
per QALY is an acceptable price to pay for health improvement in 
the US population. However, since Medicare does not fund other 
health technologies for all US citizens, it is unknown whether 
the value of US$50,000 per QALY actually represents Medicare’s 
threshold ICER. Furthermore, some authors have stated that this 
value is not based on economic theory, is not derived from expert 
consensus, and is of questionable empirical validity (Garber and 
Phelps, 1997; Gafni and Birch, 2006).
thReshold iceRs based on the value of a life
A threshold ICER can be derived from the literature estimating 
the value of a life. This literature yields an estimate of the value 
of a QALY (and, thus, the threshold ICER) by applying such tech-
niques as human capital, revealed preference and willingness to 
pay (Brazier et al., 2007). The human capital approach equates 
the value of a QALY with the economic productivity of a healthy 
individual during 1 year. The revealed preference approach infers 
the value of a QALY from observing individuals’ actual behavior 
in real-life situations that involve willingness to pay to reduce a 
risk or willingness to accept money to face a risk. For instance, 
wage-risk studies examine the relationship between the risks associ-
ated with a hazardous job and the wage that individuals require to 
accept such a job, thereby providing information about the value 
of a QALY. The third technique presents individuals with a hypo-
thetical scenario to elicit their willingness to pay for a particular 
health improvement.
A review extracted estimates of the value of a life from the lit-
erature and used these estimates to calculate the implied value of 
a QALY (Hirth et al., 2000). Estimates of the value of a life were 
elicited using the human capital approach (six studies), the revealed Frontiers in Pharmacology | Pharmaceutical Medicine and Outcomes Research  September 2010  | Volume 1  |  Article 115  |  6
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Excellence, 2009). The question was raised whether society would 
attach the same importance to technologies that extend the life 
of patients with a short life expectancy and that are licensed for 
indications affecting a small number of patients with terminal 
diseases than to other technologies. Based on research that soci-
ety may assign greater value to, for instance, severe diseases or 
pediatric diseases, NICE recommended to attach greater weight 
to QALYs accrued in the later stages of terminal diseases. These 
weights should consider the uncertainty surrounding the evi-
dence of the medicine’s clinical effectiveness and the value which 
patients with a short life expectancy place on additional months 
of life.
alteRnative appRoaches to assessing the value of 
Medicines
In light of the strengths and weaknesses of the threshold ICER 
approach (cfr. supra), a number of alternative approaches have been 
developed to assess the value of a medicine. This section describes 
these approaches by focusing on the replacement approach, pro-
gram budgeting and marginal analysis, the generalized optimiza-
tion framework, and multi-criteria decision analysis.
ReplaceMent appRoach
In order to assess the value of a new medicine A, the replacement 
approach identifies an existing medicine B which, if cancelled, 
would generate at least enough resources to fund the incremental 
costs of medicine A (Sendi et al., 2002). If the incremental out-
comes associated with medicine A exceed the outcomes foregone 
from canceling medicine B, then the health care payer can replace 
B with A, thereby increasing total health at the same or lower cost. 
For medicine A to be selected, the replacement approach identifies 
a medicine B such that:
∆C(A) ≤ ∆C(B) and ∆E(A) ≥ ∆E(B)
where ∆C(A) is the incremental costs of medicine A; ∆C(B) is the 
incremental savings from canceling medicine B; ∆E(A) is the incre-
mental outcomes of medicine A; ∆E(B) is the incremental outcomes 
foregone by canceling medicine B.
The advantages of the replacement approach are that the 
assumptions underlying the threshold ICER approach are not 
required for this decision rule. However, this approach assumes 
that it is possible to identify a medicine B so that the resources 
freed up from canceling B equal or exceed the additional costs of 
medicine A. Also, decision makers may find it difficult to discon-
tinue paying for the medicine B that is replaced by the medicine A. 
Furthermore, the medicine B may not be the highest value alterna-
tive. This approach enhances resource allocation decisions, but does 
not necessarily maximize population health subject to a budget 
constraint. Therefore, the replacement approach is a second-best 
solution for assessing the value of medicines.
pRogRaM budgeting and MaRginal analysis
Program budgeting and marginal analysis is similar to the replace-
ment approach. An expert panel is formed which may consist 
of such stakeholders as physicians, administrators, patients etc. 
Within the constraints of a program budget, this panel needs 
to identify programs for service expansion, the costs of which 
a fixed threshold ICER, but vary the threshold ICER according 
to the type of medicine, the type of disease, and the decision-
making context.
This may be the case for orphan medicines, i.e., medicines 
intended for the diagnosis, prevention or treatment of a life-
threatening or chronically debilitating condition affecting not 
more than 5 in 10,000 individuals (European Commission, 2000). 
Given their high price for an often modest effectiveness, orphan 
medicines are unlikely to provide value if their cost-effective-
ness ratio is compared to a fixed threshold value. However, other 
societal considerations may matter when evaluating an orphan 
medicine, such as the fact that these medicines tend to target life-
threatening rare diseases for which there is no alternative therapy, 
and that these medicines have a considerable impact on patients’ 
health care expenditures if they would have to incur the medicine 
costs themselves. The question arises as to how these various 
considerations can be aggregated. In other words, how can the 
often high cost-effectiveness ratio, weak clinical data, small health 
benefit, high cost and absence of an alternative therapy for orphan 
medicines be taken into account in a health care payer’s decision 
to cover such a medicine (Denis et al., 2009)? It has been argued 
that the value of the threshold ICER should be higher for medi-
cines to which society attaches a high social value (Drummond 
et al., 2009). Orphan medicines may attract a high social value, 
although future research needs to elicit social values ascribed to 
various medicines and health technologies.
Another example is oncology medicines. For instance, the 
Scottish Medicine Consortium has assessed the value of 39 
cancer medicines from 2002 to 2005 (Timoney et al., 2006). Of 
these medicines, 11 medicines were accepted, 15 medicines were 
accepted with restrictions, and 13 medicines were not recom-
mended. A review of all medicine applications showed that fewer 
randomized controlled trials were available for oncology medi-
cines and that oncology trials had a longer follow-up period than 
other medicines. There was evidence that a higher threshold ICER 
may apply to oncology medicines: although oncology medicines 
had a higher cost per QALY than other medicines [median of 
£15,000 (around US$24,309) per QALY versus £8,500 (around 
US$13,775) per QALY], acceptance rates were similar (66.7% 
versus 66.4%).
The use of the ICER to maximize health subject to a budget 
assumes that “a QALY is a QALY is a QALY” (Weinstein, 1988), irre-
spective of who receives those QALYs and how they are distributed 
within society. However, this is not the case in practice: a literature 
review has demonstrated that the value of a QALY may depend on the 
amount, duration and type of outcome; the type of individual receiv-
ing the QALY (e.g., adolescent versus elderly individuals, individuals 
suffering from a common versus rare disease, individuals suffering 
from a less severe versus a more severe disease; individuals with versus 
without dependents); and the level of health inequality within society 
(Dolan et al., 2005). Therefore, an alternative approach to specifying 
variable threshold ICERs is to keep a fixed threshold ICER, but to 
explicitly take into account such equity considerations by calculating 
a weighted QALY and, thus, a weighted ICER of a medicine.
For instance, in January 2009, NICE issued methodological 
guidance on assessing the value of end-of-life medicines and 
health technologies (National Institute for Health and Clinical www.frontiersin.org  September 2010  | Volume 1  |  Article 115  |  7
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Different techniques to aggregate the scores of a medicine 
on the different criteria can be applied to calculate the overall 
 performance of a medicine. It follows that decision makers allocate 
resources based on the ranking of medicines according to their 
performance scores until the budget is exhausted (Baltussen and 
Niessen, 2006).
the value of geneRic Medicines
The previous sections have presented approaches to assessing 
the value of originator medicines that are protected by patents. 
Once the patent expires, generic medicines can enter the market. 
A generic medicine is a medicinal product which has the same 
qualitative and quantitative composition in active substances and 
the same pharmaceutical form as the reference medicinal product, 
and whose bio-equivalence with the reference medicinal product 
has been demonstrated by appropriate bio-availability studies 
(European Commission, 2004).
Generic medicines provide value as they provide the same effec-
tiveness as the originator medicine, but at a lower cost. Generic 
medicines tend to be cheaper than originator medicines because 
generic medicines companies incur lower cost of research and 
development than originator medicines companies and because 
many countries regulate prices of generic medicines that wish to 
benefit from reimbursement. Competition from generic medicines 
may also incite originator companies to reduce prices on off-patent 
originator medicines, thus generating additional savings to health 
care payers and patients.
National generic medicines markets have developed over the 
last decade with a view to curbing pharmaceutical expenditure 
without impeding the provision of health care. However, Figure 2 
shows that the size of generic medicines markets varies (European 
Generic Medicines Association, 2008). Variation in the  development 
of generic medicines markets owes, amongst other things, to dif-
ferences in the policy and regulatory environment surrounding 
are paid by reducing other programs. If this process increases 
population health, resources are switched from current pro-
grams to programs identified for service expansion (Mitton and 
Donaldson, 2003).
This approach determines which programs need to be expanded 
or reduced by means of the ICER of each program (Mitton and 
Donaldson, 2004). Therefore, program budgeting and marginal 
analysis has similar strengths and weaknesses of the threshold ICER 
approach. In practice, only France has delisted programs in recent 
years (Sermet et al., 2010).
geneRalized optiMization fRaMewoRk
Decision makers need to allocate resources to indivisible medicines 
associated with non-constant returns to scale and need to take into 
account political, administrative, technical, and ethical constraints. 
A generalized optimization framework using mathematical pro-
gramming techniques has been proposed to maximize population 
health subject to a budget and other constraints (Birch and Gafni, 
2006a). However, such an approach requires data on the available 
budget, costs and outcomes of all medicines and comparators. In 
practice, such data are not available in most health care systems, 
thus inhibiting the practical applicability of the generalized opti-
mization framework.
Multi-cRiteRia decision analysis
Decision makers are likely to consider other criteria in addition to 
value. For instance, decision makers may wish to maximize popu-
lation health subject to a budget, to reduce health inequalities in 
the population, to prioritize preventive over curative care, and to 
attach more importance to life-threatening rare diseases.
According to multi-criteria decision analysis, an expert panel 
defines the relevant decision-making criteria and their relative 
importance. Each criterion needs to be measurable, so that the 
degree to which a medicine attains the criterion can be assessed. 
Figure 2 | generic market shares by volume of total medicines market in 2007.Frontiers in Pharmacology | Pharmaceutical Medicine and Outcomes Research  September 2010  | Volume 1  |  Article 115  |  8
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wish to vary the threshold ICER according to the type of medicine, 
the type of disease, and the decision-making context. For instance, 
a higher threshold value may be applied to orphan medicines or 
to oncology medicines.
Other approaches to assessing the value of medicines (e.g., the 
replacement approach and program budgeting and marginal analy-
sis) have focused on improving resource allocation rather than 
maximizing health subject to a budget constraint, and therefore 
are not recommended. Instead, decision makers can draw on the 
generalized optimization framework and multi-criteria decision 
analysis, when they wish to consider multiple criteria when assess-
ing the value of a medicine.
acknowledgMent
Financial support for this research project was received from 
Pharma.be.
generic medicines. This variation suggests that not all countries 
are realizing their full potential in generic medicines. For instance, 
an analysis indicated that increased generic substitution for the 
top 10 active substances in 11 European countries in 2004 would 
generate total potential savings of around 3 billion € (Simoens 
and De Coster, 2006).
conclusions
The basic principle underlying economic evaluation of medicines 
is that the ICER provides information that can be used to maxi-
mize health subject to a budget constraint. Health is maximized 
by selecting medicines with increasing ICERs until the budget is 
exhausted. This method is generally applicable and has been used 
in decision making surrounding reimbursement of medicines in 
many countries. The value of the threshold ICER should reflect 
societal preferences. This also implies that decision makers may www.frontiersin.org  September 2010  | Volume 1  |  Article 115  |  9
Simoens  The value of medicines
ducted in the absence of any commercial 
or financial relationships that could be 
construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Received: 17 June 2010; paper pending pub-
lished: 07 July 2010; accepted: 11 August 
2010; published online: 07 September 2010.
Citation: Simoens S (2010) How to assess 
the value of medicines? Front. Pharmacol. 
1:115. doi: 10.3389/fphar.2010.00115
This article was submitted to Frontiers in 
Pharmaceutical Medicine and Outcomes 
Research, a specialty of Frontiers in 
Pharmacology.
Copyright © 2010 Simoens. This is an 
open-access article subject to an exclusive 
license agreement between the authors 
and the Frontiers Research Foundation, 
which permits unrestricted use, distribu-
tion, and reproduction in any medium, 
provided the original authors and source 
are credited.
Weinstein, M. C., and Zeckhauser, 
R. (1973). Critical ratios and effi-
cient allocation. J. Public Econ. 2, 
147–157.
Wettermark, B., Godman, B., Andersson, 
K., Gustafsson, L. L., Haycox, A., and 
Bertele, V. (2008). Recent national 
and regional drug reforms in Sweden: 
implications for pharmaceutical com-
panies in Europe. Pharmacoeconomics 
26, 537–550.
WHO Commission on Macroeconomics 
and Health. (2001). Macroeconomics 
and Health: Investing in Health for 
Economic Development. Geneva: 
World Health Organisation.
Williams, A. (2004). What Could be Nicer 
than NICE? London: Office of Health 
Economics.
Conflict of Interest Statement: The 
author declares that the research was con-
evaluation in Ireland. Expert Rev. 
Pharmacoecon. Outcomes Res. 10, 
221–224.
Timoney, A., Walker, A., Paterson, K., Bennie, 
M., McIver, L., and Webb, D. (2006). The 
Scottish Medicine Consortium – Are 
Oncology Medicines Different? Adelaide: 
Third Health Technology Assessment 
International Conference.
Van Wilder, P., and Dupont, A. (2008). 
Introducing evidence-based medicine 
in reimbursement procedures: does it 
affect the outcome? Value Health 11, 
784–787.
Webb, D. (2009). Early Assessment of Cost-
Effectiveness, 14-7-2009. Edinburgh: 
Congress of the European Association 
for Clinical Pharmacology and 
Therapeutics.
Weinstein, M. C. (1988). A QALY is a 
QALY – or is it? J. Health Econ. 7, 
289–290.
Sendi, P., Gafni, A., and Birch, S. (2002). 
Opportunity costs and uncertainty in 
the economic evaluation of health care 
interventions. Health Econ. 11, 23–31.
Sermet, C., Andrieu, V., Godman, B., 
Van, G. E., Haycox, A., and Reynier, 
J. P. (2010). Ongoing pharmaceutical 
reforms in France: implications for key 
stakeholder groups. Appl. Health Econ. 
Health Policy 8, 7–24.
Simoens, S., and De Coster, S. (2006). 
Potential savings from increased 
substitution of generic for originator 
medicines in Europe. J. Generic Med. 
4, 43–45.
Stinnett, A. A., and Mullahy, J. (1998). Net 
health benefits: a new framework for 
the analysis of uncertainty in cost-
effectiveness analysis. Med. Decis. 
Making 18, S68–S80.
Tilson, L., and Barry, M. (2010). Recent 
developments in  pharmacoeconomic 